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Abstract.  The prospects of integrating full-blown biological taxonomies into an ontological reasoning 
framework are reviewed. Traditionally ontological representations of taxonomy have adopted the model of a 
single and static hierarchy. This model is contrasted with a more realistic situation involving dynamic 
revisions of particular groups and alignments among alternative taxonomic perspectives. Taxonomic practice 
is bound by a range of epistemological constraints and linguistic conventions that run orthogonal to the 
logical background from which ontological entities and relationships originate, resulting in severe challenges 
for ontological representation and reasoning. In particular, the purported existence of a single hierarchy in 
nature forces taxonomists to gradually approximate this hierarchy and make frequent rearrangements in light 
of new evidence. The evolvability of taxa implies that taxon-defining features may be lost in subordinate 
members or independently gained across multiple sections of the tree of life. As a result, many terms for 
phenotypic properties are phylogenetically underdetermined and have limited hierarchical transitivity. The 
standard approach of defining taxa both in reference to properties (intensional) and members (ostensive) 
undermines the individual/class dichotomy that sustains conventional ontologies, and compromises the 
reasoning capabilities associated with this distinction. Neither the use of Linnaean ranks in taxonomy nor the 
250-year legacy of nomenclatural adjustments have obvious analogues in the ontological realm. Lastly, the 
piece-meal appearance of full-blown taxonomic information makes it necessary to use expert alignments to 
obtain a comprehensive static perspective. In light of these limitations, research along the taxonomy/ontology 
interface should focus either on strictly nomenclatural entities and relationships or on ontology-driven 
strategies for aligning multiple taxonomies, but not on building static networks for large portions of the tree 
of life. The prospects of using ontology-based services in taxonomy will largely depend on the ability of the 
taxonomic expert community to present its products in ways that are more compatible with ontological 
principles than concurrent practice. 
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Biologically oriented ontologies are regarded as 
essential for integrating a vast range of biological 
data (Goble and Stevens, 2008). Having originated 
in the biomedical sector (Smith et al., 2007), the 
development of such ontologies is now branching 
out into other disciplines including behavior 
(Midford, 2004), ecology (Jones et al., 2006; 
Madin et al., 2008), evolution (Mabee et al., 2007), 
anatomy (Ramírez et al., 2007; Mikó and Deans, 
2009; Vogt et al., 2009; Balhoff et al., 2010; 
Dahdul et al., 2010; Mungall et al., 2010), and 
taxonomy (Schulz et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the 
impact of ontology-based information services has 
been uneven, in part because of differences in 
needs and resources among disciplines. It may 
seem particularly intriguing that the field of 
systematics1 was not among the first to shift 
towards using ontologies, even though species 
names are prime vehicles for transmitting 
biological data and taxonomic hierarchies appear 
very similar to ontology networks. In spite of such 
an apparent match, actual representations of 
taxonomy in information services such as 
GenBank are rather simplistic (cf. Wheeler et al., 
2008); and therefore are unable to support 
                                                            
1 The terms systematics and taxonomy are used interchangeably 
herein, and each encompasses phylogenetics as a subdiscipline that 
informs the establishment of classifications (Wheeler, 2004). 
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semantically complex searches or inferences across 
alternative taxonomic perspectives (Page 2004, 
2007; Thau and Ludäscher, 2007; Dahdul et al., 
2010). This is unfortunate because a 
thoroughgoing ontology for biological taxonomy 
could play the same overarching role in the bio-
ontological domain that taxonomy plays in biology 
(Schulz et al., 2008).  
This paper examines to what extent a full-
blown representation of biological taxonomy in the 
ontological domain is possible. Using Schulz et 
al.'s (2008) pioneering work as a point of 
departure, we first observe that there are two 
fundamentally different models to create 
ontological representations of taxonomy; viz. 
strictly nomenclatural and full-blown taxonomic 
representations. Each model serves a different 
purpose and user domain. We furthermore 
distinguish between static and dynamic 
perspectives of taxonomic classifications, arguing 
that only the latter is well suited to represent the 
reasoning needs of taxonomists. We then describe 
a number of ontological representation challenges 
posed by biological taxonomy under the full-blown 
dynamic model; including epistemological 
limitations, linguistic conventions, and alignment 
challenges. Our review concludes with a series of 
practical recommendations for advancing the 
taxonomy/ontology interface, with an emphasis on 
research tasks for the taxonomic expert 
community. 
 
NOMENCLATURAL VERSUS FULL-BLOWN 
TAXONOMIC REPRESENTATIONS 
Biological taxonomy integrates a wide variety 
of heterogeneous data, including information on 
physical specimens and voucher samples, 
taxonomic names and nomenclatural relationships, 
phenotypic and genotypic properties of taxa, and 
hierarchical phylogenetic groupings and 
classifications. Some user communities are well 
served by focusing on a subset of this immense 
data pool. For instance, taxonomic experts might 
have great use for an ontology of strictly 
nomenclatural relationships (homonymy, 
synonymy, typification, etc.) among accepted and 
rejected Linnaean names (Scoble, 2004; Kennedy 
et al., 2005; Page, 2006; Franz and Peet, 2009; 
Huber and Klump, 2009). Such nomenclatural 
entities and relationships have a tractable history, 
and representations of this history in an ontological 
network are useful – up to a point – for identifying 
and integrating taxonomic legacy information 
(Berendsohn et al., 2003). Nevertheless, 
nomenclatural relationships such as "is a 
misapplied name for" or "is a pro parte synonym 
for" are often not sufficient to permit reasoning 
among of alternative and succeeding taxonomic 
perspectives (Franz, 2005a). To our knowledge no 
comprehensive ontology of nomenclatural entities 
and relationships exists, making this a worthwhile 
if semantically limited pursuit. 
Other examples of ontologies with a strong 
taxonomic component include phenotype 
ontologies for model organisms (Smith et al., 
2007). By design, these phenotype networks fall 
short of representing the depth and breadth of 
taxonomic information across large sections of the 
tree of life. 
In what follows, we will deliberately 
concentrate on ontologies that aim to represent 
authoritative, expert-produced phylogenies and 
classifications, as opposed to just nomenclatural 
relationships. We refer to such ontologies as full-
blown if they permit inferences ranging from 
queries about the taxonomic identity of specimens 
to reasoning about evolutionary properties across 
multiple lineages (see Dahdul et al., 2010, for a 
rationale of this approach). In this context, the 
ontological framework developed by Schulz et al. 
(2008) is remarkable and pioneering effort. The 
authors (pp. i314-i315) intend "to provide classes 
and classificatory criteria to categorize the 
foundational kinds of biology, without any 
restriction to granularity, species, developmental 
stages or states of structural well- or ill-
formedness". To this end they utilize a set of 
complementary ontological relationships (cf. fig. 2 
on p. i318); including is_a (example: a taxon 
quality is a quality), part_of (example: the 
Mammalia class region is part of the Animalia 
kingdom region), and instance_of (example: the 
individual "Clyde" is an instance of the species 
Elephas maximus ); as well as more taxonomic-
specific relationships such as inheres_in (example: 
the quality of having an elephant heart inheres in 
the species Elephas maximus ); derives_from 
(example: the HeLa cell line derives from human 
cells [but exists separately from the human 
population]), has_granular_part (example: the 
population of Thai elephants has a granular part 
"Clyde"), and located_in (example: a species 
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quality is located in the Elephas maximus  species 
region). Suitable combinations of these 
relationships allow Schulz et al. (2008) to connect 
individual organisms and populations (particulars) 
to their respective species (universals), link their 
properties (qualities) to particular species, and 
integrate these qualities up to higher levels 
(regions) in the taxonomic hierarchy (see Fig. 1). 
Schulz et al.'s (2008) ontology is therefore a first 
approximation of the kind of full-blown 
ontological representation of biological taxonomy 
that is our focus hereinafter. 
 
STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES 
Ontologies are necessarily biased to suit 
particular representation and reasoning demands 
(McCray, 2006). Accordingly, ontologies for 
biological taxonomy may focus on truly 
ontological aspects of taxa in nature  (example 
question: what are species?); or alternatively, on 
the epistemological challenges of representing taxa 
in systematic practice  (example question: how did 
Rivera delimit Mus musculus  in her 1980 
publication?).2 On one side of the spectrum, 
ontology creators must address such contentious 
issues as whether taxa are real in a suitable sense 
(Ereshefsky, 2002; Lee, 2003; Johansson, 2006; 
Merrill, 2010), what natural boundaries exist 
between species and populations (Hey, 2006; 
Schulz and Hahn, 2007), and whether taxa are 
historical individuals or natural kinds (Ghiselin, 
1997; Boyd, 1999). Different perspectives on these 
theory-laden issues will lead to different 
ontological implementations, as is reflected in 
Schulz et al.'s (2008) elaborate attempts to 
represent taxa as meta-properties, class hierarchies, 
populations, qualities, or qualia (regions of 
qualities). At the same time the authors place little 
emphasis on how actual taxonomies come about, 
relying instead on use cases that consider 
taxonomic hierarchies as a relatively simple and 
stable (Fig. 1). 
Ontology development on the other side of the 
spectrum focuses on representing concepts and 
relationships inherent in taxonomic publications 
(e.g., Yoon and Rose, 2001; Pullan et al., 2005; 
Thau and Ludäscher, 2007; Franz et al., 2008; 
                                                            
2 This distinction permits, but does not presuppose, that concepts used 
in systematic practice may correspond closely to 'true' and causally 
sustained entities and relationships in nature. See Merrill (2010) for 
further discussion. 
Thau, 2008; Thau et al., 2008, 2009; Franz and 
Peet, 2009). These efforts are motivated by the 
need to integrate alternative taxonomic 
classifications and biological linked to them. The 
goal is therefore to extract whatever ontology-
compatible information is encrypted in a published 
taxonomy. Unfortunately most taxonomic works 
display some form of logical inconsistency (Thau 
and Ludäscher, 2007; Franz, 2009; Vogt et al., 
2009); including regional and taxonomic sampling 
biases, incomplete semantic treatments, implicit 
references to other works, and mosaic (as opposed 
to strictly hierarchical) distributions of phenotypic 
features (Fig. 2). Ontological representations must 
capture the underlying similarities and differences 
between such multiple perspectives. In short, they 
are more concerned with representing what 
taxonomists mean than with what taxa are.  
The two disparate views of the 
taxonomy/ontology interface have strong 
implications for ontology development and usage. 
Specifically, the various solutions presented in 
Schulz et al. (2008) all adhere to a static 
perspective of taxonomy: ontological entities and 
relationships are regarded as correct and stable 
enough to permit reasoning across a single 
taxonomic hierarchy. The static perspective 
assumes that at any given time there is a 
community-wide agreement as to how taxonomic 
entities are constituted and connected in nature. 
Schulz et al. (2008) are not alone in employing this 
view, which also underlies proposals to establish a 
unitary taxonomy (cf. Scoble, 2004) and is 
commonplace in on-line taxonomic information 
services including GenBank and the Catalogue of 
Life (Page, 2004; Berendsohn and Geoffroy, 2007; 
Franz et al., 2008). 
Schulz et al.'s (2008) model use case (Fig. 1) 
shows a hierarchy passing from the kingdom 
Animalia through six intermediate ranks to the 
species Elephas maximus.  Yet in context of 
taxonomy's century-long history, this classification 
may only represent a momentary snapshot, 
ignoring previous disagreements or ongoing 
debates about the identity of taxonomic entities. 
When instead classifications are modeled so as to 
accurately reflect their nature as intermittent 
summaries of ongoing research, the result is a 
complex network of competing hypotheses whose 
relative support changes over time. For instance, 
Vane-Wright (2003) reviews a series of alternative 
  48
 
Fig. 1. Idealized taxonomic hierarchy as depicted in  Figure 1 of  Schulz et al. (2008). Taxon qualities inhere in 
individual organisms (or parts thereof), and at the same time represent instances of species- and higher-level taxon 
qualities. 
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perspectives on species identities in the Amauris 
butterfly complex.3 He concludes (p. 10):  
[I]f we are to move to any system  approaching 
Godfray's unitary ideal, then we will have to  
come to terms with either making arbitrary 
choices among competing classifications […], or 
accept the additional burden of arriving at some 
compromise or consensus at the outset. [ …] In 
my experience, the taxonomic community does 
not seem to be ready to accept the idea of  
compromise or consensus. 
The extent to which taxonomies evolve over 
time is easily underestimated. Geoffroy and 
Berendsohn (2003) reanalyzed 12 succeeding 
classifications of German mosses from 1927 to 
2000 (Koperski et al., 2000). Of the 1548 
taxonomic entities recognized in 2000, 44.5% were 
unstable, 20% were potentially unstable, and an 
additional 22.2% had undergone nomenclatural 
changes in comparison to previous treatments; 
leaving only 13.3% of the entities consistent in 
name and circumscription over a 73-year period. 
Franz et al. (2008) compared eight succeeding 
classifications of North American vascular plants 
from 1933 to 2006. Only 55% of the currently 
valid concepts remained stable over the examined 
time period. These numbers are expected to 
decrease further when analyzing more diverse and 
understudied lineages such as invertebrates (cf. 
IISE, 2009). In other words, the static model used 
by Schulz et al. (2008) assumes a level of stability 
that has so far been unattainable for many 
taxonomic groups. 
The dynamic perspective relaxes the frequently 
unjustified requirement of taxonomic stability. 
Under this view, names, specimens, descriptions, 
illustrations, proposed homologies, molecular 
evidence, and other kinds of core taxonomic 
information are potentially varying elements of 
taxonomic concepts that evolve and replace each 
other over time (Berendsohn, 1995). A particular 
perspective, published by an author or group of 
authors at a specific time and place, makes explicit 
or implicit reference to some or all of these 
elements. Alternative perspectives are either 
congruent or (partially) incongruent with each 
other. The ontological challenge, then, is to 
                                                            
3 Clark et al.'s (2009) model of taxonomy as an eScience similarly 
allows multiple perspectives to be represented and updated 
dynamically following peer review. 
accurately represent the elements of alternative 
taxonomies and connect them in ways that are 
logically consistent and permit reasoning across 
these taxonomies (Thau and Ludäscher, 2007; 
Thau, 2008; Thau et al., 2008, 2009). 
To achieve this goal, taxonomic experts must 
provide an initial, non-exhaustive set of concept 
relationship mappings or alignments (Koperski et 
al., 2000; Franz and Peet, 2009). Given two 
taxonomies and the initial expert alignments, 
ontological reasoning can perform a series of 
useful inferences; including the implementation of 
global taxonomic constraints (non-emptiness, etc.), 
checks for logical consistency, logical repairs, 
inferences of implied relations, removal of 
redundant relations, and the merging of aligned 
concepts (Thau et al., 2008, 2009). However, as 
currently implemented the dynamic perspective 
focuses solely on the issue of concept congruence 
and otherwise treats the contents of taxonomic 
concepts as black boxes. This narrow approach is 
not sufficient to facilitate a full-blown ontological 
representation of taxonomy. 
 
ONTOLOGICAL REPRESENTATION CHALLENGES 
In allowing taxonomies to evolve over time, 
the dynamic perspective is best suited to represent 
the products and interests of the taxonomic expert 
community. The static approach, on the other hand, 
is effective when taxonomy is virtually a constant, 
which is only a reasonable assumption in well 
circumscribed lineages such as model organisms. 
As illustrated above, each view has its inherent 
strengths and limitations. Moreover, both dynamic 
and static ontological representations of taxonomy 
have so far focused on use cases that are strongly 
simplified in comparison to full-blown taxonomic 
publications. They have been developed by 
following the semantic restrictions of ontological 
languages used in computer science (e.g., OWL 
Web Ontology Language4). Because of their origin 
in description logic (Baader et al., 2004), these 
languages do not necessarily respond to special 
representation demands posed by biological 
taxonomies. They were certainly not conceived to 
address occurrences of varying species concepts 
(Wheeler and Meier, 2000) or evolving 
perspectives of higher-level taxa. 
                                                            
4 http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-features/. 
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While it is necessary to explore the 
taxonomy/ontology interface with existing 
ontology languages like OWL, we also need to 
understand which phenomena they cannot 
represent, even though these phenomena may play 
an important role in taxonomy. By reviewing the 
full range of representation demands from the 
viewpoint of taxonomic practice, we may thus 
identify features that prominent ontological 
languages can, or cannot, handle. Clearly, both 
sorts of features must be understood to advance the 
development of ontologies for taxonomy. 
In the following sections we describe a non-
comprehensive set of full-blown taxonomic 
phenomena that constitute severe representation 
challenges in the ontological realm. These 
phenomena are often interconnected. They are 
organized here starting with three kinds of 
epistemological constraints (Sections I to III), 
continuing with special linguistic conventions 
(Sections IV and V), and ending with challenges 
related to the alignment of taxonomies (Sections 
VI and VII). Throughout, the example of a 
phylogeny and classification of the weevil genus 
Apodrosus Marshall (Girón and Franz, 2010) is 
used to illustrate the challenges being discussed 
(Fig. 2; Table 1). 
  
Sections I to III – Epistemological Constraints 
I. NATURE HAS THE LAST LONG WORD 
Biological taxonomies are proposed and used 
by humans and in that sense they are socially 
mediated constructs (Bowker and Star, 1999). 
However, taxonomists working under the widely 
accepted paradigm of evolution have no intention 
to construct wholly artificial systems. Instead, they 
strive to discover natural phylogenetic 
relationships among the taxa under study (Hennig, 
1966). Most will agree that evolution on Earth has 
unfolded along a linear time scale, resulting in a 
unique sequence of events and causally sustained 
relationships – a single, true phylogeny.5 This 
phylogeny is what systematists aim to reconstruct 
and represent in their classifications.  
Taxonomists often argue about the quantity 
and quality of character evidence and the validity 
                                                            
5 This is an oversimplification, particularly when applied to microbial 
lineages where hereditary information is often passed on 
horizontally (cf. Bapteste et al., 2009; Boto, 2009; Fraser et al., 
2009). The main point nevertheless remains valid enough for the 
present context. 
of inference methods placing a certain group close 
to another one. For instance, the twisted-wing 
parasites (Strepsiptera) are notoriously difficult to 
place among the insect orders; with beetles and 
flies being the two most favored possibilities 
(Whiting, 1998; Bonneton et al., 2006). Despite 
such disagreements, it is understood that there are 
no multiple correct answers, and no answer can 
prevail mainly for conventional reasons. Indeed, 
the naturalness of taxa – their unique origin and 
coherence through time – is thought to exist 
independently of human classifications.  
Biological taxonomy differs in this sense from 
more conventional ontologies of (e.g.) pizzas or 
human diseases (Horridge et al., 2004; Du et al., 
2009). In many research disciplines outside of 
taxonomy, it is epistemologically permissible to 
maintain multiple alternative hierarchies. As a 
result, the process of generating standard 
ontologies more readily leads to agreements about 
the context-specific utility of entities and their 
relationships. For instance, it is more 
straightforward to stipulate the truth content of the 
relationship "CheeseTopping is_a PizzaTopping" 
or "Carcinoma of the Large Intestine is_a 
Carcinoma", than it is to assert that "Strepsiptera 
is_a Halteria" (= a member of the haltere-bearing 
lineage that presumably includes flies; cf. Whiting, 
1998). Unlike the former two assertions, which 
may be useful or not depending on the inferential 
context, the validity of the latter assertion depends 
on the final outcome of complex investigations of 
homology – a special and highly theory-laden kind 
of similarity resulting from common ancestry (e.g., 
Wagner, 2001; Franz, 2005b; Assis and Brigandt, 
2009). While systematists are allowed at any time 
to posit such a relationship about the Strepsiptera, 
its truth content is subject to continuous inductive 
testing of phylogeny and its inferential reliability is 
an a posteriori phenomenon. 
Boyd (2000) uses the term bicamericalism to 
describe the process of delimiting biological taxa. 
This means that both our linguistic conventions 
and the causal structure of the world make up the 
content of taxa – therein understood as natural 
kinds – but the latter has the "final word". Indeed, 
the impact of nature's causal relationships on 
taxonomy is so strong that classifications require 
continuous revision in light of new evidence. 
Taxonomic research is an ongoing quest to 
approximate phylogeny where new insights may 
 51 
 
Fig. 2 . Phylogeny and classification of the weevi l genus Apodrosus Marshall (Girón and Franz, 2010). Species that are not part of 
Apodrosus represent three tribes: Anypotactini ( A. bi caudatus and P. scans orius); Polydrusini (C. ni grocinctus, P. coni cus, P.  
mutabilis and P. peninsularis); and Sitonini (S. californicus), the latter chosen as the "root". The full scientific names are provided and 
select phylogenetically informative characters are mapped onto the  internal branches. Grey rectangles represent synapomorphic 
transformations and white rectangles represent homoplasious transformations. The numbers above and below each rectangle 
correspond to character numbers and states, respectively. For explanations of letters A to N see Table 1. 
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lead to radical realignments even of higher-level 
categories (e.g. Cavalier-Smith, 2004). This 
iterative inferential process differs dramatically 
from the logic-driven, stipulative ontology building 
that is prevalent in the information sciences 
(Baader et al., 2004). The epistemological 
challenge of generating reliable statements of 
homology often compromises our ability to 
produce stable taxonomies and develop ontologies 
based on them. 
The sheer magnitude of the task of building a 
full-blown ontology differentiates taxonomy from 
other domains. Large portions of the tree of life 
remain insufficiently explored, particularly in 
megadiverse lineages such as arthropods (5-10 
million species estimated; Ødegaard, 2000), fungi 
(up to 1.5 million species estimated; Schmit and 
Mueller, 2007), and microbial organisms (up to 10 
million species estimated; Sogin et al., 2006; 
though see Fraser et al., 2009, for a discussion of 
problems related to species delimitation in 
bacteria). Some 18,500 new species were added to 
the global count in the year 2007 alone (IISE, 
2009). With only 1.8 million species named – 
likely less than 10% of the total species richness on 
Earth – the task of completing the global inventory 
will take several additional centuries (Wheeler, 
2004). Each species contains vast amounts of 
phylogenetic information that will require expert 
analysis to achieve a reliable classification. 
Discoveries of "missing link" fossils may lead to 
rearrangements of the sequence of deeper splits in 
the hierarchy (e.g. Franzen et al., 2009). On the 
other hand, working solutions for smaller and well 
known groups such as mammals appear feasible (~ 
5420 species and 37,400 synonyms; Wilson and 
Reeder, 2005). 
 
II. ENTITIES WITH EVOLVING PROPERTIES 
Because biological taxonomies organize the 
products of evolutionary history, they have to 
accommodate certain phenomena that characterize 
species and higher-level taxa, such as the 
evolvability of traits (Boyd, 1999). Two of the 
most critical concepts related to the generation of 
phylogenies are (1) homology, the similarity of 
traits resulting from common ancestry (see above); 
and (2) homoplasy, the similarity of traits resulting 
from convergence or reversal (Schuh and Brower, 
2009). According to Hennig (1966), natural taxa 
are characterized by synapomorphies, i.e. derived 
homologous features whose unique origin in the 
tree of life has been inductively corroborated. The 
silk-spinning organs ("spinnerets") that 
characterize all spiders are a textbook example of a 
synapomorphy. 
Synapomorphies may be unreversed or 
reversed within the taxon they define. In the latter 
case, a feature that defines the taxon as a whole, 
and presumably evolved in its ancestor, has 
subsequently been modified at the genetic level 
and is phenotypically absent ("lost") in one or 
more of the taxon's younger subgroups. In other 
words, the defining feature is not obviously present 
in all descendants of the ancestor. Instead, its 
presence – manifested in a modified state at the 
molecular level – must be inferred on the basis of 
the overall tree structure (see also Fig. 2; Table 1). 
This is how we can accurately classify the 
phenotypically limb- and digit-less snakes as 
members of the natural taxon Tetrapoda. While 
this sort of classificatory practice poses no deep 
problems for human recognition and 
communication, a feature that is phenotypically 
absent (though inferred as present in an altered 
genotypic state) in a subordinate member of the 
superordinate class defined by it, may be difficult 
to represent in the language of description logics. 
At the very least, the condition of transitivity of 
properties from higher to lower level members in 
the hierarchy is violated.6 
Convergent properties present additional 
problems. A shared property that is phenotypically 
the "same", or even rooted in the "same" 
transformations at the molecular level, is not 
considered homologous if phylogeny indicates an 
independent origin in two taxa with no recent 
common ancestor. To provide an example, both 
flies and twisted-wing parasites have one pair of 
their thoracic wings modified into halteres, which 
are stalked and terminally knob-like structures that 
function as balancing organs during flight. In flies 
these structures are attached to the third thoracic 
segment, whereas in the twisted-wing parasites 
they occur on the second thoracic segment. 
Whether or not these structures are considered 
homologous depends in part on the outcome of 
future phylogenetic studies. If it turns out that flies 
                                                            
6 Molecular phylogeneticists frequently represent homology 
statements in a probabilistic framework (Nielsen, 2002; Sober, 
2002), which constitutes an additional representation challenge (J. 
Felsenstein, pers. comm.). 
Biodiversity Informatics, 7, 2010, pp. 45-66 
 
54 
 
and twisted-wing parasites are sister taxa (Whiting, 
1998), then they may jointly be named "Halteria" 
and defined by the homologous presence of 
halteres. In the opposite case (Bonneton et al., 
2006), "halteres" are no longer a synapomorphy of 
a natural taxon. Instead we would have to take into 
account the phylogenetic contextuality  of this 
feature – (1) "halteres of flies" and (2) "halteres of 
twisted-wing parasites" – and use each descriptor 
separately to characterize the respective groups. 
The degree of homoplasy of a property across 
the tree of life frequently depends on its descriptive 
precision (Wenzel and Carpenter, 1994; Proctor, 
1996; Rieppel, 2007; Franz and Engel, 2010). In 
the aforementioned example, "halteres" is a rather 
specific term that may ultimately refer to a 
homologous structure with a single evolutionary 
origin. The term is at the lower end of the range of 
levels of homoplasy commonly used in taxonomy. 
At the other end, we observe terms referring to 
broadly delimited properties, for instance "petal 
color red" or "ventral side of prothoracic tibia with 
a row of triangular teeth". Such widely 
circumscribed properties may have hundreds of 
independent origins in the evolution of 
angiosperms and insects, respectively. Within a 
particular lower-level group, "petal color red" or 
"presence of a protibial row of teeth" might well 
map onto a homologous state. When used at more 
inclusive levels, however, these descriptors will 
become increasingly homoplasious and 
phylogenetically uninformative, picking out sets of 
taxa that have no recent common ancestor. Thus 
the referential validity of broadly defined 
phenotypic terms fundamentally depends on a 
precise specification of the phylogenetic context. 
In spite of the above, it is common practice to 
reuse broadly defined phenotypic terms without 
making the phylogenetic context explicit enough 
("eyes globular", "hind legs saltatorial", 
"wingless", etc.; see also Fig. 3). The result is a 
phylogenetic underdetermined and multi-
referential terminology. This problem also affects 
the utility of ontologies being defined for 
morphological structures of plants (Avraham et al., 
2008), fish (Dahdul et al., 2010), spiders (Ramírez 
et al., 2007), wasps (Mikó and Deans, 2009), and 
other taxonomic groups (Smith et al., 2007). Even 
though each of these controlled vocabularies 
includes many taxon-specific terms, the terms are 
not consistently embedded in a phylogenetic 
context that recognizes convergent occurrences in 
the tree of life. They are perhaps best thought of as 
a powerful set of phenotype-categorizing metadata 
(Vogt et al., 2009). As such, they stand to make 
great contributions to the standardization of 
taxonomic descriptions (Vogt, 2009), but will not 
automatically facilitate ontological reasoning 
within a phylogenetic framework. As argued 
above, any morphological term that is not mapped 
to a unique and unreversed property in the tree of 
life must be further annotated with a taxonomic 
delimiter ("halteres of flies ").7 Only then does the 
term pass on from the strictly diagnostic to the 
phylogenetic language realm. The need for 
additional, context-specifying qualifiers for 
properties is much less prevalent in other 
ontological networks. 
 
III. INDIVIDUAL- AND CLASS-LIKE COMPONENTS 
The philosophical literature is testimony to a 
longstanding debate as to whether species and 
higher-level taxa are individuals or classes (= 
natural kinds). This discussion permeates Schulz et 
al.'s (2008) ontologies and motivates their 
introduction of inherent taxon qualities (see 
above). But beyond the development of ontologies, 
the individuals-versus-kinds debate has had little 
impact on the practice of classifying taxa (Keller et 
al., 2003; though see de Queiroz and Gauthier, 
1992). As summarized by Brigandt (2009: 78, 95): 
[…] a species or a higher taxon can be 
construed both as an individual and a natural 
kind, i.e. both views are metaphysically 
compatible. Yet one conceptualization can be 
pragmatically preferable depending on the 
epistemic considerations that are  in play in a 
certain scientific context. Taxa are best 
construed as natural kinds when they are viewed 
as taxonomic units, while it is preferable to view 
taxa as individuals when they are conceived of  
as units of evolutionary change. […] The upshot 
of my discussion for t he individualism vs. kinds 
debate is that the relevant question is not so 
much into which metaphysical category species 
and higher taxa fall, but how biological accounts 
of taxa (such as species concepts) underwrite 
                                                            
7 One reviewer stated that OWL allows such context specification 
through addition of a sufficient condition; and furthermore, that 
morphological ontologies are singled out unfairly here for not 
performing a service they were never designed for. Both objections 
are valid to a degree, though neither refutes the point that standard 
taxonomic practice and its ontological implementation are poorly 
matched up with the need to support phylogenetic inferences. 
 5
 55
 
Fig. 3. Example of a full-blown taxonomic representation of a species of damselfish, Chromis circumaurea sec. Pyle 
et al . (2008: 15), including (A ) intensional components (diagnosis, description), ostensive components (type 
specimens), as well as (B) links to images, DNA data, and globally unique identifiers for individual specimens (cf. 
Hyam, 2009; Page, 2009). Reproduced with permission of the authors and journal. 
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classifications and generalizations, shed light on 
the unity of taxa across time, and permit 
explaining their ability to undergo change a s a 
unit – all of which are epistemic issues. 
Taxonomists have adopted a hybrid a pproach to 
circumscribe taxa, i.e. one that uses both 
intensional (property-based) and ostensive 
(member-based) components (Fig. 2; Table 1). 
This practice is ingrained in the Linnaean tradition 
(Farber, 1976; Stevens, 1984), where species 
definitions are fixated by the combination of a 
verbal diagnosis (intensional, often accompanied 
by illustrations) and the designation of a type 
specimen (ostensive). 
The practice of pointing to a type is especially 
critical at the species level (Fig. 3). Taxonomic 
disagreements and nomenclatural synonymies are 
often resolved in direct reference to the identity of 
type specimens (e.g. Gardner and Hayssen, 2004). 
Typification is also mandatory at the genus level, 
but becomes increasingly less prevalent as one 
climbs up the hierarchy to the level of family, 
order, class, etc. While it is common to list all 
examined specimens when defining a new species 
(e.g., Franz, 2010), there is virtually no use in 
designating a specimen to typify megadiverse 
lineages such as the class Insecta. In practice the 
latter is sufficiently well defined by listing a set of 
diagnostic properties or synapomorphies (Grimaldi 
and Engel, 2005). 
Thus, we observe a gradual shift from 
ostensive to intensional components in accordance 
with the inclusiveness of the taxon being defined. 
This convention matches up well with human 
cognitive abilities and inference needs (Brigandt, 
2009; Franz, 2009). For instance, it is not 
necessary for humans to examine specimens of 
every species of the scarab beetle superfamily 
Scarabaeoidea in order to reliably recognize them 
as such. A generic illustration of the 
synapomorphic, asymmetrically lamellate antennal 
club is sufficient for this purpose. Similarly, two 
experts talking about the weevil genus 
Perelleschus Wibmer & O'Brien may understand 
each other even though each has only seen 
specimens from Central and South America, 
respectively, which share no common species 
(Franz and O'Brien, 2001). Our cognitive tendency 
to shift towards "loosely typified" intensional 
definitions explains why regional and taxonomic 
sampling biases are acceptable in higher-level 
phylogenetic analyses. These definitions have 
greater predictive value and are especially useful 
for making wide-reaching inferences about the 
identity of a taxonomic group – past, present, and 
future, yet their referential precision is 
compromised by increasing levels of homoplasy 
and evolutionary transformation (Section II). 
Ostensive definitions are more accurate but offer 
few inferential benefits beyond specific 
identification of a set of specimens or taxa.8 
 Schulz et al. (2008) are highly responsive to 
the individuals-versus-kinds problem (see also 
Gangemi et al., 2001). While recognizing the 
complex interaction of ostension and intension in 
taxonomy, the authors discard several of their 
initial proposals; viz. taxa as meta-properties, 
hierarchies, and populations. Instead, they propose 
to represent taxa as qualities; in the sense that an 
individual organism or part thereof has an inherent 
quality of pertaining to a taxon (individual  
species). That taxon, in turn, has the quality of 
pertaining to a higher-level taxon (species  
genus, etc.). The addition of quality regions  
seemingly offers a workable transition from the 
realm of particulars to universals. However, this 
solution leads to a sort of "molecular essentialism" 
where taxon-level qualities can inhere in an 
isolated sequence of nucleic acids (P. E. Midford, 
pers. comm.). Moreover, the approach ignores why 
taxonomists single out specific properties to 
characterize taxa within a larger lineage (Hennig, 
1966; Wheeler and Meier, 2000), and fails to 
recognize that taxonomists use utilize ostensive 
and intensional elements flexibly and 
inconsistently at varying levels (e.g., Sereno, 2005; 
Franz and Peet, 2009; Schuh and Brower, 2009). 
Therefore the taxa-as-qualities proposal remains 
too simplistic in comparison to actual practice. In 
the end, any approach that decides one way or the 
other with regards to the purported individual/class 
dichotomy falls short of the reasoning powers that 
humans derive from hybrid definitions of taxa. 
Sections IV and V – Special Linguistic Conventions 
IV. LINNAEAN RANKS 
Linnaeus (1758) advocated the strict use of 
ranks for taxonomic names – a convention that has 
                                                            
8 From an ontological viewpoint it is even arguable whether preserved 
specimens count as members of their respective taxa, given that 
they have lost key molecular or behavioral (P. E. Midford, pers. 
comm.). 
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now persevered for more than 250 years (Schuh, 
2003). Particularly names for mid- to higher-level 
taxa incorporate standardized terminations 
indicating their rank. In zoology, for instance, the 
names of tribes end with -ini, subfamilies end with 
-inae, families end with -idae, and so on. The 
botanical nomenclature has at least 13 fixed 
terminations for ranks up to the level of division (-
phyta, -mycota ) (ICBN, 2006). Although the 
number of ranks is in principle indeterminate, the 
nomenclatural Codes only regulate the application 
of endings for a relatively small number of ranks, 
not reaching beyond the level of family in zoology 
(ICZN, 1999). But the use of more finely tiered 
ranks is pervasive in taxonomy, where prefixes 
such as super-, sub-, and infra- provide additional 
levels of resolution to accommodate increasingly 
more bifurcated trees and refined phylogenetic 
classifications (e.g. McKenna and Bell, 1997). A 
single classification may include (1) ranked names 
(i) with or (ii) without standardized endings; (2) 
informal names that map onto unranked sections of 
the hierarchy (e.g. "paleoherbs"; cf. Nixon and 
Carpenter, 2000); and (3) sections that are not 
named at all (unnamed clades, taxa of uncertain 
position, etc.).  
Adding a rank ending to a taxonomic name 
might seem nothing more than an arbitrary 
convention with limited significance for 
ontological reasoning. Yet it is precisely this 
convention which allows humans to make 
countless implicit and inter-subjectively reliable 
inferences about taxonomic relationships without 
necessarily having to visualize a reference tree. 
Many mid- to higher-level taxa have conspicuous 
and well conserved synapomorphies. The coupling 
of the features with a ranked name and 
standardized ending reinforces a mental 
association between them. The cognitive pay-offs 
are aptly characterized in this example by Platnick 
(2001: 8-9; see also Platnick, 2009): 
I was wandering around John Murphy's garden 
out in Hampton, and came across a nice jumping 
spider. Now, jumping spiders, the family 
Salticidae, are probably the easiest of all spider 
families to  recognize. With their large anterior 
median eyes, their excellent vision, the often 
highly exuberant and ornamented morphology 
that males use in their elaborate courtship 
displays, and their pr owess at jumping on prey  
several body-lengths away, salticids are quite  
distinctive. [… ] If you visit the [World Spider 
Catalog] site, you'll find a summary table that 
shows, for each of  the 109 currently recognized 
spider families, the numbers of currently valid 
genera and species, including, at the very end of 
the list, the salticids, with  4,834 species. Using 
the Linnaean hierarchy, when I identified the 
spider in John's garden as a salticid, I was 
asserting that John's spider is more closely 
related to any single species currently included 
within the Salticidae than it is to any single 
species that is currently excluded from that 
family. In other words, if my identification, and 
the current classification, are both correct, then 
John's spider is more closely related to salticid 
species #1 than it is to any of the 32,752 spider 
species currently excluded from the Salticidae. It 
is also more closely related to salticid species #2 
than it is to any non-salticid spider. So, assuming 
that the spider from John's garden belongs to 
one of the currently known 4,834 salticid species 
(and this being England, that's certainly a f air 
assumption), then my identification enables 4,833 
(other salticids) times 32,752 (non-salticids) 
three-taxon statements. So by placing the animal 
as a salticid, the current Linnaean hierarchy 
allows me to make 158,290,416 three-taxon 
statements about it, within spiders alone. If I 
were to expand the arena to include all 
arthropods, or all life, the number of implied 
three-taxon statements would, for all practical 
purposes, approach one third of infinity – the 
other two-thirds would be prohibited. That's 
none too  shabby, for a single word – Sa lticidae 
(admittedly, in a context provided –  solely –  by 
the Linnaean hierarchy, and the mutual 
exclusivity of equally ranked names it requires). 
Even if we concede that Linnaean ranks alone 
are not sufficient to convey the level of speaker 
expertise portrayed in this example, it is clear that 
using ranks has immense inferential advantages. 
Put simply, two taxa that have the same rank 
ending within a single coherent classification 
cannot share any subordinate members (see also 
Thau et al., 2009). This perfect nestedness allows 
humans to make countless accurate inferences 
about the placement of subordinate members into 
these non-overlapping taxa – Platnick's (2001) 
three-taxon statements – without having to 
memorize their diagnostic feature or exact position 
in the overall hierarchy. In addition, and despite 
the fact that rank assignments are not 
evolutionarily comparable across the tree of life 
(cf. Avise and Johns, 1999), many taxon/rank 
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couplings do remain stable enough so that relevant 
biological phenomena become tied them over time 
(e.g., Salticidae ↔ large anterior median eyes, 
prowess at jumping, elaborate courtship). Students 
of biology often begin by recognizing orders, then 
families, and later on lower ranked entities such as 
genera and species. At each level they establish 
meaningful cognitive links between ranked names 
and biological traits; e.g. members of the 
Formicidae (ants) are highly eusocial, the workers 
are female and wingless, etc. Whenever (minor) 
rank changes occur, it is relatively easy for humans 
to adjust by making a limited number of rank 
reconnections (e.g. subfamily [-inae]  tribe [-
ini]) while keeping much of the learned 
name/information association intact. 
Linnaean ranks and standardized endings have 
no obvious match in conventional ontologies. To 
address this issue, Schulz et al. (2008) created a 
secondary hierarchy of rank classes that interfaces 
with the primary taxon quality hierarchy. However, 
as the authors concede themselves (p. i320): "the 
meaning of the taxonomic rank classes […] is 
somewhat counterintuitive, since every instance of 
SpeciesQuality is also an instance of GenusQuality 
and so on. They are, therefore, not suited to 
comprehensively represent the meaning of Species 
as disjoint from Genus, Kingdom, etc." Other 
attempts to incorporate ranks into ontologies have 
opted to render them "ontologically weak"; treating 
a taxon as an instance_of its rank as opposed to the 
stronger is_a relationship which would give ranks 
the status of meta-classes and associated reasoning 
powers (Dahdul et al., 2010; P. E. Midford, pers. 
comm.). In short, translating the inferential 
benefits of ranks into the ontological realm has so 
far remained elusive. 
 
V. NOMENCLATURAL AND TAXONOMIC LEGACY 
Taxonomy is bound in its use of names by a 
legacy that reaches back some 250 years to 
Linnaeus' (1758) Systema Naturae.  Many taxon 
names and definitions were first published in that 
work. Linnaeus (1758) also laid out a set of rules 
for naming taxa, including his binomial system and 
advocacy of ranks. In zoological taxonomy in 
particular, these rules were expanded by Strickland 
et al. (1843) who introduced the Law of Priority 
and other requirements regarding the typification 
of names (Farber, 1976). These efforts have 
gradually evolved into the current nomenclatural 
Codes (e.g., ICZN, 1999). The process of 
amending the Codes continues in response to new 
threats to the stability of names and associated 
information (e.g., ICZN, 2008).  
Application of the rules of nomenclature for 
nearly 250 years has transformed the taxonomic 
literature into a continuous chain of publications 
with quasi-legal status (Minelli, 2003). Any new 
publication must recognize relevant nomenclatural 
and taxonomic precedents. Indeed, new 
taxonomies are mostly communicated through 
existing names whose meanings were established 
in earlier publications. Often these meanings are 
revised, expanded, or contracted in complex ways. 
As taxonomic revisions accumulate and supersede 
each other over time, they tend to create a network 
of many-to-many relationships among valid names, 
invalid synonyms, and past and present meanings 
(Koperski et al., 2000; Geoffroy and Berendsohn, 
2003; Franz, 2005a; Kennedy et al., 2005; Franz et 
al., 2008). The situation is compounded by the fact 
that nomenclatural and full-blown taxonomic 
relationships are established in different and 
frequently non-congruent ways; the former being 
determined strictly on the basis of the identity of 
type specim ens, whereas the latter involve 
comparison of diagnostic features  and other kinds 
of phylogenetic information. The trajectories of 
nomenclatural and taxonomic relationships among 
names are therefore semi-independent and must be 
modeled separately to record partial name/meaning 
disjunctions over time (Koperski et al., 2000; 
Kennedy et al., 2005; Franz and Peet, 2009). 
The history of taxonomy is littered not only 
with an indelible record of nomenclatural 
relationships but with thousands of published 
taxonomies that are partially incomplete, outdated, 
or of questionable quality and validity. 
Nevertheless, some cross-section of this body of 
work represents our best present-day knowledge of 
nature's hierarchy (cf. Maddison et al., 2007). 
Many old classifications have been fully replaced 
by more recent revisions. Yet even the least 
regarded publications (cf. Jäch, 2006) are part of 
taxonomy's enduring ledger and must be linked in 
some ways to a more widely accepted view. It is 
generally not permissible in taxonomy to purge 
low quality work from the record or to ignore 
names coined in obscure treatments (cf. Godfray, 
2002). 
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In this sense, taxonomy presents legacy 
integration difficulties that go beyond those of 
more conventional ontologies. While it is 
considered best practice in any domain to link a 
new ontology to a relevant predecessor (Euzenat 
and Shvaiko, 2007; Smith et al., 2007; Sahoo et al., 
2008), there are no quasi-legal requirements to do 
so. No laws of priority or rules for typifying 
classes exist that, if violated, would render the new 
ontology invalid. There are also no clear analogies 
to the consistent separation of type-based 
nomenclatural versus full-blown taxonomic 
relationships among the elements of succeeding 
ontologies. Lastly, it is permissible in most 
domains to ignore a previous ontology if it no 
longer has any utility. The result is a more uniform 
framework for reasoning that is not overly 
compromised by idiosyncratic entities and 
relationships of the past. 
 
Sections VI and VII – Alignment Challenges 
VI. STATIC ALIGNMENTS – CORE VERSUS 
PERIPHERAL INFORMATION 
For reasons given in Section I, no team of 
authors is capable of publishing a full-blown 
taxonomy that spans across the entire tree of life. 
To the extent that such "complete" taxonomies are 
available, they represent compilations of multiple 
treatments published on subsections of the tree 
(Scoble, 2004). They tend to have a limited amount 
of information associated with each taxon name 
(e.g.,9), and typically provide no information on 
types and synapomorphies, or even links to sources 
in the primary taxonomic literature. This means 
that all published classifications are somehow are 
incomplete, due either to insufficient breadth (not 
all taxa covered) or depth (not all information 
provided of the covered taxa), or both. 
New taxonomic contributions must adopt a 
piece-meal approach, focusing on select taxa and 
sources of data; e.g., morphological traits and/or 
molecular sequence information. Beyond this core 
taxonomic focus, each new treatment usually 
connects to peripheral taxonomic information 
stemming from relevant predecessors. To provide 
an example, the most recent revision of the weevil 
genus Cotithene Voss (Franz, 2008) contains a 
near-complete account of core taxonomic 
information on the genus itself and all eight 
                                                            
9 http://www.catalogueoflife.org/. 
constituent species; including differential 
diagnoses and detailed lists of specimens 
designated to represent each taxon. On the other 
hand, this work makes only peripheral and implicit 
statements about the taxonomy of related genera, 
without listing specimens or even naming all 
species per genus. Mostly there are pointers to 
other treatments which contain this information. In 
contrast, a separately published genus-level 
reclassification of the tribe which contains 
Cotithene offers much less taxonomic information 
on this genus in particular (Franz, 2006). Instead 
the focus is on inferring synapomorphies that 
define monophyletic groups within the tribe. 
Beyond this narrow focus there is only minimal 
information on other tribes from which or into 
which certain genera are transferred (Franz, 2009). 
Thus the "semantic joints" to non-focal data remain 
vague (see also Fig. 2; Table 1). 
The piece-meal nature of taxonomic 
publications and incurred differential focus on core 
versus peripheral information result in severe 
challenges for ontology building. Specifically, if 
the goal is to represent the entire tree of life based 
on both intensional and ostensive data, then 
information from many independently published 
sources must be linked together to obtain just a 
single static perspective. Primarily ostensive 
classifications of catalogues (e.g. Alonso-Zarazaga 
and Lyal, 1999) would have to be integrated with 
exemplary phylogenetic studies (cf. Prendini, 
2001) so that names and concepts listed in the 
former may be further defined through 
synapomorphies. Phylogenetic mid-level analyses 
must be linked to species descriptions and 
specimen data provided in taxonomic revisions, 
and so on. 
Considering the semantic complexity of the 
information to be integrated, the goal of a single 
full-blown ontology of the tree of life becomes 
almost as difficult as the underlying research itself. 
Most critically, the integration process must 
involve third-party expert  asses sments in order to 
connect core results from multiple publications at 
their peripheral "edges" and thereby construct a 
contiguous information-rich network. In light of 
the inherent vagueness of these "edges", the 
assessments require expertise of the historical and 
regional context in which each publication was 
produced. Different expert teams may propose 
different ways in which to integrate such works. 
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Therefore the challenge of developing a single tree 
of life ontology rapidly devolves into making 
intersubjective assessments of concept equivalence 
among partial ontologies. In practice this translates 
into matching taxonomies at their edges using 
taxonomic concept relationships. This challenge is 
further discussed in the next section. 
 
VII. DYNAMIC ALIGNMENTS 
As seen above, the assembly of a full-blown 
static ontology for taxonomy and dynamic 
integration of alternative taxonomies both require 
some measure of ontology alignment. Thau et al. 
(2009) provide an overview of the logical and 
computational challenges involved in optimizing 
this process. Here we will concentrate on the 
semantic challenges posed by the initial expert 
alignments.  
Koperski et al. (2000) were the first to use a 
vocabulary of five terms derived from set theory in 
order to align two separately published taxonomic 
concepts C1 and C2 with each other; as follows 
(symbols according to Thau et al., 2009): (1) 
congruence (C1  C2), (2) proper inclusion (C1  
C2), (3) proper inverse inclusion (C1  C2), (4) 
partial overlap (C1  C2), and (5) exclusion (C1 ! 
C2). The terms have since been employed 
sporadically by other authors (e.g., Gradstein et al., 
2001; Güntsch et al., 2003; Kennedy et al., 2006; 
Weakley, 2006; Graham and Kennedy, 2007; Craig 
and Kennedy, 2008; Franz et al., 2008; Krings, 
2008). Franz and Peet (2009) subsequently showed 
that this vocabulary must be expanded to account 
for different relationships based on whether the 
intensional or ostensive subcomponents of two 
concepts are compared. An example for such a 
scenario is given in Section III: two experts 
working in Central America (C1) and South 
America (C2) agree on the diagnosis of 
Perelleschus based on jointly recognized 
synapomorphic features, but each lists a mutually 
exclusive set of species in the corresponding 
regional treatment of the genus. Accordingly, the 
intensional alignment of the two concepts is C1  
C2 whereas the ostensive alignment is C1 ! C2. The 
intensional congruence indicates that the concepts 
are in agreement as to what species generally 
belong to Perelleschus – past, present, and future. 
The ostensive exclusion, in turn, reflects the fact 
that the two experts happen to work with a 
regionally biased and non-overlapping set of 
species. Only the combined alignments capture 
how the two concepts relate to each other with in 
terms of their predictive content and explicitly 
included members. 
Franz and Peet (2009) showed how the 
expanded vocabulary can be applied to express (1) 
how taxonomic (C) and nomenclatural (N) 
relationships are interconnected (e.g. C1  C2 AND 
N1 is a heterotypic synonym for N2); (2) whether 
there is uncertainty in an alignment (e.g. C1  C2 
OR C1  C2); (3) how to negate a relationship (e.g. 
C1 NOT  C2); (4) if there is a way to reconcile two 
classifications through addition or subtraction of 
concepts on one side (e.g. C1  C2 + C3); or (5) 
whether two authors stipulate different feature-
based definitions (INT) of a taxon even though 
they examined the same set (OST) of subordinate 
members (e.g. C1 INT  C2 AND C1 OST  C2). 
Depending on the richness of the source data, such 
combined alignments can represent partial concept 
matches and implicit judgments of errors in the 
aligned taxonomies. These capabilities are not yet 
available in an ontological environment. 
 Even though alignments are essential for 
connecting concepts occurring in alternative 
taxonomies, they cannot replace expert judgment 
as to whether certain instances of congruence or 
non-congruence are significant with respect to a 
particular integration task. One might ask, for 
instance, whether two feature-based definitions of 
a taxon pick out a sufficiently similar set of 
subordinate members when each is applied outside 
its geographic context. The answer will vary 
according to case-specific standards of 
"sufficiently similar": what is similar enough for an 
ecological study may not suffice for an analysis of 
adaptive radiation, and so on (cf. Peterson and 
Navarro-Sigüenza, 1999). In this regard it is 
difficult to image that taxonomic concept 
alignments will ever become fully automated (see 
also Geoffroy and Güntsch, 2003; Thau and 
Ludäscher, 2007; Thau et al., 2009). 
 
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
As reviewed above, taxonomic practice is 
bound by a range of epistemological constraints 
and linguistic conventions that run orthogonal to 
the logical background from which ontological 
entities and relationships originate (Baader et al., 
2004). The enormous challenge of reconstructing 
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the tree of life compromises the goal of creating an 
ontology that is comprehensive and reliable 
enough to permit reasoning about taxa and their 
properties. The inherent evolvability of taxa poses 
genuine ontological challenges in the philosophical 
sense of the term, because it undermines the 
individual/class dichotomy and associated 
reasoning capabilities that sustain conventional 
ontologies (cf. Schulz et al. 2008). In addition, the 
idiosyncratic yet indelible 250-year legacy of 
nomenclatural and taxonomic changes has resulted 
in an immense network of names and concepts that 
can only be aligned with an expanded vocabulary 
whose application requires expert input. For better 
or worse, we should recognize that much of 
taxonomy's cumulative body of work is not well 
aligned with the requirements for ontological 
representation and reasoning. 
Our analysis could explain why the 
development of ontologies for taxonomy has 
lagged behind in comparison to other disciplines. 
To the extent that taxonomic research is still 
focused on acquiring and interpreting primary data 
to generate a natural classification, the prospects of 
reliably applying these data in a metadata-driven 
ontological framework will remain limited. Many 
ongoing projects in taxonomy are motivated 
precisely by the insight that the existing "ontology" 
for a particular lineage – i.e., the previously 
established classification – is incomplete or at least 
partly wrong (Vane-Wright, 2003). This is not an 
optimal foundation for positing stable, logic-based 
definitions and relationships among taxa. 
In light of these limitations, we suggest that a 
full-blown and static representation of taxonomic 
information for large portions of the tree of life is 
not the most fruitful path to advance research along 
the taxonomy/ontology interface. Instead, our 
efforts should concentrate (1) on representing 
strictly nomenclatural relationships (Huber and 
Klump, 2009), and (2) on improving ontology-
driven vocabularies and algorithms for producing 
alignments between multiple taxonomies (Franz et 
al., 2009; Thau et al., 2009). Taxonomic experts 
stand to benefit from each of these developments 
because they will facilitate the identification and 
integration of taxonomic legacy information. Both 
types of services may become stepping stones 
towards a dynamic ontological network 
representing the products of taxonomic research. 
Conversely, full-blown and static ontologies 
for major organismal lineages will neither serve 
taxonomy nor its users in the long term. The utility 
of such ontologies is limited to smaller groups 
where the assumption of taxonomic stability is 
reasonable (cf. Smith et al., 2007; Dahdul et al., 
2010; Mungall et al., 2010). In either case, 
researchers should for the most part refrain from 
resolving "deep questions" about the ontological 
nature of taxa because the answers will vary 
according to the preferred inferential context 
(Brigandt, 2009). 
We furthermore suggest that the prospects of 
utilizing ontological reasoning in taxonomy will 
largely depend on the ability of the expert 
community to present phylogenies and 
classifications in ways that are more compatible 
with ontological principles than concurrent 
practice. Minimally, this means: (1) adopting strict 
conventions for linking new core taxonomic 
information to (provisionally accepted) peripheral 
information so that the relevant context of the new 
contribution is fully defined; (2) using lineage-
specific phenotype ontologies for taxonomic 
descriptions while specifying the phylogenetic 
context of the descriptive terms in use (cf. Ramírez 
et al., 2007; Mikó and Deans, 2009; Dahdul et al., 
2010); (3) presenting all nomenclatural and 
taxonomic novelties in an ontology-compatible 
format, including intensional and ostensive 
definitions (see also Sereno, 2009); and (4) 
providing intensional and ostensive alignments to 
entities in relevant preceding taxonomies (Franz 
and Peet, 2009; Thau et al., 2009). 
The implementation of these practices will 
require a wider acceptance of the taxonomic 
concept approach (Berendsohn, 1995; Koperski et 
al., 2000; Franz et al., 2008). In particular, 
taxonomists will have to become more disciplined 
in recognizing acts of authoring or citing concepts 
as well as identifying specimens or subordinate 
concepts to them (Franz and Peet, 2009). Adopting 
this approach may also force taxonomists to have 
more control over the economics of maintaining a 
cyberinfrastructure for the publication, continuous 
versioning, and cross-linking of such concepts. 
While these goals are worthy of pursuit, they will 
likely remain elusive in the short term. 
Neither taxonomists nor developers of 
ontologies should be under the illusion that full-
blown ontologies for taxonomy will soon be 
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dynamically assembled and updated without also 
putting in place robust mechanisms for recognizing 
individual expert contributions (cf. Clark et al., 
2009). Although phylogenies and classifications 
may represent no more than a means to an end for 
user communities (Dahdul et al., 2010), they 
constitute the primary intellectual products of 
taxonomists. The latter rely on signaling their 
authorship of these products in order to advance 
their academic careers. Schulz et al.'s (2008) ideal 
of an overarching ontology-based framework for 
organizing all organismal information implicitly 
requires that the field of taxonomy regains a more 
powerful role among the biological disciplines. 
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